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ABSTRACT 
Data has become one of the most important resources in post-
modern information society. However, European civil law does not 
reflect this development adequately. In fact, so far, European civil 
law seems to struggle with handling data as a legal entity. Against 
this background, the article provides a transnational overview and 
a comprehensive analysis of the legal situation in Europe. It dis-
cusses why data ownership is widely perceived as a problem on this 
side of the Atlantic and how this perception can be overcome by a 
fundamental property law approach. Taking into account economic 
realities, we argue that European property law provides a sufficient 
framework for establishing a theoretical concept of data ownership. 
Therefore, we draft the dimensions of a data ownership concept by 
proposing potential criteria for assigning ownership and analyzing 
both positive access and negative restriction rights. 
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I. WHY DATA OWNERSHIP MATTERS 
Data is a duplicable virtual entity, i.e., neither tangible nor ex-
clusive by nature. Looking into nowadays digital economy, though, 
we quickly realize that data is de facto regarded as if it were a 
“thing” that can be owned like goods and chattels. According to the 
European Commission, “[d]ata has become an essential resource for 
economic growth, job creation, and societal progress.”1 In the big 
data era it is indeed uncontested that data is an asset, if not the asset 
of the 21st century.2 However, legal analysis shows that private law 
in Europe does not reflect this reality so far. Scholars and practition-
ers claim that private laws consistently struggle with handling data 
as a legal entity.3 
Against this background and taking into account all major Euro-
pean legal systems, we argue that European property law already 
provides sufficient common principles to establish a comprehensive 
concept of data ownership.  
                                                                                                             
 1. European Commission, Building a European Data Economy, at 2, COM 
(2017) 9 final (Jan. 10, 2017) [hereinafter Building a European Data Economy]. 
 2. E.g., European Consumer Commission, Meglena Kuneva, Personal Data 
is the New Oil of the Internet and the New Currency of the Digital World, Keynote 
Speech at the Roundtable on Online Data Collection, Targeting and Profiling, 
SPEECH/09/156 (Mar. 31, 2009). 
 3. Wolfgang Kerber, A New (Intellectual) Property Right for Non-Personal 
Data?, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND RECHT, INTERNATIONALER TEIL 
[GRUR INT.] 989, 990 (2016); Robert Hieke, Big Data, 5 ZEITSCHRIFT ZUM 
INNOVATIONS- UND TECHNIKRECHT [INTER] 10, 11 (2017); Artur-Axel Wandtke, 
Ökonomischer Wert von Daten, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 6, 6 (2017); 
Karl-Heinz Fezer, Theorie des immaterialgüterrechtlichen Eigentums an 
verhaltensgenerierten Personendaten der Nutzer als Datenproduzenten, MMR 3, 
5 (2017) (claiming the need for a sui generis right). 
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For this purpose, we will give a concise summary of the relevant 
supranational framework before diving into an analysis of national 
laws. By applying a property law approach, we will then take a close 
look at whether data can be seen as a tangible good and how owner-
ship rights are acquired and transferred. Subsequently, we will dis-
cuss specific problems regarding data ownership and marketability, 
particularly data theft, bankruptcy, and lien. 
Thereafter, we will draft the dimensions of a data ownership 
concept by proposing potential criteria for assigning ownership and 
analyzing both positive access and negative restriction rights. Fi-
nally, the data ownership concept will be brought into line with con-
flicting rights such as personal rights, privacy, and freedom of infor-
mation. 
II. EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK 
On a European level, there is no concerted approach to the ques-
tion on data ownership. While there still is a lack of clarity whether 
data ownership of any kind is accepted, some of the underlying legal 
principles and legal norms might come in handy to develop guide-
lines to a data ownership. 
A. European Primary Law 
As for the European primary law,4 which prevails over other le-
gal sources, the treatment of data is affected by the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
the Treaties of the European Union. 
                                                                                                             
 4. European Primary law is the supreme law of the European Union and is 
at the apex of the European legal order. It mainly consists of the Treaties of the 
EU out of which the latest—the Treaty of Lisbon—implemented the current 
Treaty on European Union [TEU] and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union [TFEU], see consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 01. 
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1. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and 
European Convention on Human Rights 
Data is an information carrier regarding subjects or circum-
stances; in case of personal references, the European law provides 
specific rights to the data subject. Concerning this matter, article 8 
of the Charter5 lays down that everyone has the right to the protec-
tion of personal data concerning him (no. 1) and that such data must 
be processed fairly for specific purposes and on the basis of the con-
sent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law (no. 2). Therefore, the European primary law states 
some sort of data sovereignty on behalf of the individual. Even if 
personal data is only a small aspect of the overarching concept of 
data ownership, this very basic principle has to be kept in mind re-
garding the acceptance of exclusive rights on data. 
Another primary source of EU law is the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR).6 The ECHR does not provide the pro-
tection of personal data in particular, but the protection of privacy 
in general.7 To that effect, informational self-determination is 
deeply associated with personal freedom and privacy. Hence, to this 
principle, data protection law sets up preconditions for the handling 
of data. 
                                                                                                             
 5. As can be derived from Art. 6 (1) TEU, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union [CFR] is part of the European primary law. See 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 23, 2012, 2012 O.J. 
(C 326) 02. 
 6. See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS no. 005 (1950). Art. 6 TEU incorporates the 
Convention as primary law. If necessary, the Court of Justice may refer to these 
principles in order to complement the fundamental rights protected in the CFR. 
 7. Art. 8 of the ECHR states: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. 
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2. Digital Single Market 
In contrast to the rather personal approach of data protection, the 
EU also stipulates economic interests in its primary law, which are 
related to the potential use and marketability of data as an asset. Ac-
cording to article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the 
EU shall establish an internal market, i.e., create a harmonized 
framework for the free movement of goods, services, and capital. 
This facilitates the promotion of competition, jobs, and reduction of 
trade barriers.8 With respect to the proceeding digitalization, a com-
mon European framework is needed to provide specific rules for the 
marketability of data.  
Therefore, the European Commission proposed a “Digital 
Agenda for Europe in the year 2020.” Its main objective is to create 
a digital single market that covers digital marketing, e-commerce, 
and telecommunication. In January 2017, the Commission defined 
this agenda by adopting a draft communication on building a Euro-
pean Data Economy. The plan states that free movement of data re-
quires the reduction of unjustified restrictions, like public parame-
ters for the location of data for storage or country-specific law ap-
proaches in regard to data and furthermore, the necessity of data ac-
cess, the facilitation of data sharing, and the acceptance of a data 
producer’s right, i.e., the “right to use and authorize the use of non-
personal data.”9 As a consequence of this agenda, an exclusive prop-
erty right of data could be demanded. 
3. Fundamental Freedoms  
The above-mentioned strategy of the Commission has a strong 
relation to the fundamental freedoms of the single market that are 
laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
                                                                                                             
 8. Internal Market, EUR-LEX, https://perma.cc/UX99-Z4T6. 
 9. See Building a European Data Economy, supra note 1, at 13. 
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(TFEU). Three of these principles provide valuable starting points 
for an approach to data ownership.  
The principle of free movement of goods (articles 28–37 TFEU) 
appoints the elimination of customs duties or quantitative re-
strictions as well as the prohibition of measures having an equivalent 
effect.10 Referring to the term “goods,” the European Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ) implies products that can be valued in money and that are 
subject of commercial transactions.11 Without prejudice to the 
ECJ’s decision, it is commonly agreed that the free movement of 
goods requires some sort of tangibility of the product.12 Neverthe-
less, one must take into account that even gas, electricity, or soft-
ware, which is stored on a data carrier, are covered by this principle. 
These exceptions exist irrespectively of their concrete physical man-
ifestation, which suggests that data could also be captured. Hereaf-
ter, the equal treatment of goods and data demands for the assign-
ment of property to one individual.  
Besides the free movement of goods, articles 63–66 TFEU regu-
late the free movement of capital within the European Union. Euro-
pean legislation does not provide any legal definition of the term 
“movement of capital,” which is why one refers to Annex 1 of Di-
rective 88/361 that lists several categories, like loans, liens, or any 
other capital movement,13 but not data. Nevertheless, data are simi-
lar to the categories not exhaustively mentioned: if data was seen as 
a form of currency, the directive would apply. However, this is 
clearly not the case. There are neither data exchange rates, nor a 
maximum volume of data in circulation nor inflation rates. Quite the 
contrary: the more data is available, and the more analysis options 
exist, the more valuable the data becomes.14 That is why data has a 
                                                                                                             
 10. Marius Maciejewski, Free movement of goods, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
(Oct. 2018), https://perma.cc/W2AX-RUDY. 
 11. Case 7/68, Comm’n v. Italy, 1968 E.C.R. 423. 
 12. WALTER FRENZ, 1 HANDBUCH EUROPARECHT 93 (2d ed., Springer 2012). 
 13. Council Directive 88/361, Annex 1, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 8. 
 14. Dirk Heilmann & Thomas Liegl, Big Data und Datenschutz, 
HANDELSBLATT RESEARCH INSTITUTE (2013), https://perma.cc/8DEV-Q6HW. 
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unique value for some stakeholders: the business model of social 
networks, cloud computing companies, or e-commerce services is 
built entirely upon data. Though it is harder to rate and specify data 
in the offline world, even there it is used to assess customer behavior 
and consequently benefit economically from it. Therefore, it cannot 
be denied that data is a modern form of a financial asset, which is 
why the underlying idea of protecting the free movement of capital 
applies in principle to data as well. Therefore, one might argue that 
the principle of free movement of capital can be seen as an apprecia-
ble normative landmark. 
Furthermore, the TFEU stipulates in articles 56–62 the free 
movement of services, which includes only intangible and profes-
sional activities (e.g., the provision of digital services like personal-
ized advertisements based on Facebook likes). 
Thus, the Fundamental Freedoms of the EU and the primary law 
deliver indications for the use and trade of data (services). Insofar, 
the acceptance of exclusive rights would strengthen the economic 
marketability of data.  
B. European Secondary Law 
For a comprehensive overview of the European framework, we 
also need to take into account European secondary legislation, i.e., 
regulations and directives passed by European institutions such as 
the Parliament or the Commission.15 Secondary legislation is a level 
down in the normative hierarchy, but provides rather detailed regu-
lations. In search of data-specific legislation, we come across the 
recently passed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),16 the 
Directive on e-Privacy, and the Directive on e-Commerce. 
                                                                                                             
 15. TFEU Art. 288. 
 16. European Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679, Apr. 27, 2016, 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 
O.J. (L119) 1. 
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1. Steps Toward “Data Sovereignty” in the GDPR 
The GDPR entered into force in May 2018 and replaced the di-
rective on data protection from 1995.17 As a regulation it is manda-
tory law and directly applicable in all member states, facilitating a 
further harmonization of data protection in the Union. Even though 
the GDPR does not provide specific regulations for any form of data 
ownership, there are two pertinent developments worth emphasiz-
ing. 
Firstly, the GDPR stipulates the right to erasure (most com-
monly labeled as a “right to be forgotten”), which gives the data 
subject the right to obtain, from the controller, the erasure of per-
sonal data concerning him without undue delay. It particularly ap-
plies if the data subject withdraws his consent on which the pro-
cessing is based.18 In other words, the individual is granted a power 
of exclusive disposition concerning the processing of personal data 
that is—to some extent—comparable with the power of the owner 
over his property. In terms of property law, this could be understood 
as a negative dimension of an exclusive right, i.e., the power to ex-
clude others from using one’s property. 
Secondly, the GDPR introduces a fundamentally new right to 
data portability. Article 20 gives the data subject the right (a) to re-
ceive the personal data concerning him from the controller in a struc-
tured, commonly used and machine-readable format, and (b) to 
transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the 
controller to which the personal data have been provided. In this re-
gard, it is an accompanying measure to the right to access.19 It ad-
dresses the so-called lock-in20 that arises particularly from social 
                                                                                                             
 17. European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC, Oct. 24, 1995, on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) [GDPR], 
1995 O.J. (L281) 31 (EC). 
 18. GDPR Art. 17 § 1(a). 
 19. GDPR Art. 15. 
 20. Jürgen Kühling & Mario Martini, Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung: 
Revolution oder Evolution im europäischen und deutschen Datenschutzrecht?, 
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networking services (SNS); the underlying reasoning is to enable the 
individual to change from one SNS to another with just a single 
mouse click.21 As a matter of fact, it can be seen as a brand new 
instrument in exercising the individual’s power over his data. By 
granting the data subject the capacity to decide about further pro-
cessing and access, the right to data portability goes way beyond the 
well-established principle of consent.22 Therefore, it can be seen as 
another step towards a (privacy-based) concept of data ownership. 
2. Data as a Good in the Directive on e-Privacy 
The ePrivacy Directive23 requires member states to ensure the 
free flow of personal data in the Union—a wording that can also be 
found in other secondary legislation, e.g., article 1 (1) GDPR. As 
such, it serves as a reference to the fundamental freedoms in general 
and the free movement of goods in particular. It indicates that data 
is considered as a transferrable asset or at least as comparable to 
tangible goods that may be subject of a free movement between 
member states. 
The ePrivacy Directive, however, provides an additional refer-
ence point; namely, measures should be taken to prevent unauthor-
ized access to communications including both the contents and any 
data related to such communications.24 The prevention of unauthor-
ized access draws a connection to property rights: the “owner” of 
                                                                                                             
EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 448, 450 (2016); Peter R. 
Benson, Data Portability the Antidote to Data “Lock-In,” Electronic Commerce 
Code Management Association [ECCMA] White Paper on Data portability (Apr. 
1, 2009), https://perma.cc/VG4Q-EFR5. 
 21. European Commission, Impact Assessment, at 106, SEC (2012) 72 final 
(Jan. 25, 2012). 
 22. Tim Jülicher et al., Das Recht auf Datenübertragbarkeit – Ein 
datenschutzrechtliches Novum, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DATENSCHUTZ [ZD] 358, 361 
(2016). 
 23. European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/58, July 12, 2012, con-
cerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the elec-
tronic communications sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC) [hereinafter Directive 
2002/58] (the directive is about to be reformed by a “ePrivacy” Regulation in 
2019). 
 24. Id. at recital no. 21. 
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data is by law entitled to exclude others from accessing his (im)ma-
terial property—just like the owner of a tangible good.  
3. Parallels Between Safekeeping and Hosting Contracts in the 
Directive on E-Commerce 
Other sources of secondary legislation reveal further similarities 
of data and tangible property. Article 14 of the Directive on e-com-
merce,25 for instance, regulates the liability of a host provider, i.e., 
someone who provides data storage on a contractual basis. It stipu-
lates that the host provider is not liable for the information stored on 
the condition that he does not have actual knowledge of illegal ac-
tivity or information. In this regard, hosting contracts are quite sim-
ilar to safekeeping contracts, since both usually require subjective 
elements such as said knowledge to hold the safekeeper or host lia-
ble.26 This implies another parallel reasoning for goods and data.  
C. Interim Findings 
Even though there is no specific legislation addressing data own-
ership on a supranational level, we discovered a considerable num-
ber of data-related provisions that express two major tendencies: 
firstly, recent European legislation strongly reflects the increasing 
relevance of data, both economically and societally. Secondly, the 
European framework suggests that data and its marketability are 
generally comparable to the tangible goods regime. Against this 
background, European legislation illustrates not only a common un-
derlying trend but also provides general conditions for determining 
a pan-European concept of data ownership. However, European pri-
                                                                                                             
 25. European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31, June 8, 2000, on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic com-
merce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) (EC) 1 (the Commission is about 
to initiate the revision of the directive). 
 26. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, 
RGBL 195, as amended, §§ 688, 694 (Ger.). 
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mary law does not allow for a comprehensive supranational regula-
tory approach as core issues of civil law are exclusively subject to 
national legislation.27  
III. NATIONAL LAWS IN EUROPE 
As mentioned above, the core issues of civil law lie within the 
competence of the member states. Therefore, in this section, we fo-
cus on the framework of property law and its core principles on the 
national level. This aims to provide the basis for our approach by 
identifying commonalities within the member states’ legal systems 
and transferring those rules that are applicable to our concept of data 
ownership to a European level. 
A. Data as Tangible Property 
On a national level, the previous findings lead to the question 
whether data can be considered a “thing” in terms of property law. 
More specifically, whether data can be considered as being corpo-
real in regards to the right in rem. This is basically the first crux of 
the matter.  
1. Historical Influences and Preliminary Considerations  
Historically, the term “thing” originated from the 1,500-year-old 
Roman Corpus Iuris Civilis, one of the first attempts within the his-
tory of modern law to unify and codify statutory rights regarding 
tangible and intangible property. The basic distinction was based on 
the possibility to touch an item.28 If this was the case, the item was 
classified as corporeal; otherwise, it would be incorporeal. In some 
European legal frameworks, the legal term “thing” is restricted to 
                                                                                                             
 27. According to the principle of conferral, the EU shall act only within the 
limits of the competences conferred upon it by the member states, Art. 5 § 1, § 2 
TEU—no competence has been given in this matter.  
 28. ROLF KNÜTEL ET AL., CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS – DIE INSTITUTIONEN 60 (4th 
ed., C.F. Müller 2013). 
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anything, except for corporeal objects, due to the narrow under-
standing of von Savigny. His interpretation eliminates all non-tangi-
ble assets from property law.29 A ius naturale point-of-view allows 
for a wider comprehension of the term “thing.” Codifications that 
have a stronger law of nature background, such as the French30 and 
Austrian31 examples, consider that property can also include non-
tangible objects, inter alia obligations and debts. In all European le-
gal systems, the classification of a “thing” as a legal good is essential 
in order to establish exclusive rights regarding utilization and the 
right to defend valuable assets.32 The title of ownership, as the high-
est level of a legal right in property law, is a further common aspect 
within all national frameworks.33  
The acknowledgement of corporeality as valuable in terms of 
property law is due to a tangible “thing” being marketable and the 
option to, therefore, use it as a security interest, for instance, placing 
a lien on it. It is even possible to have a usufruct solely on the 
grounds of the property asset of a “thing.”34 This demonstrates that 
the approval of an exclusive right through the unwritten laws of an 
intangible asset (for instance, energy or heat) must be based on its 
aptitude of circulation and its marketability.35  
                                                                                                             
 29. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, DAS SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN 
RECHTS 338 (Veit 1840); FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, DAS 
OBLIGATIONENRECHT ALS THEIL DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 23 (Veit 
1851). 
 30. FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, DROIT CIVIL—LES BIENS 43 (9th ed., Dalloz 2014), 
referring to Art. 1240 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] (Fr.) [hereinafter C. 
CIV.].  
 31. ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jun. 
1, 1811, Justizsammlung [JGS] No. 946/ 1816, as amended, §§ 285, 292 (Austria) 
[hereinafter ABGB]. 
 32. ELKE HERRMANN, KERNSTRUKTUREN DES SACHENRECHTS 1 (Mohr 
Siebeck 2013); CHRISTIAN VON BAR, GEMEINEUROPÄISCHES SACHENRECHT 5, 6 
(C.H. Beck 2015). 
 33. HERRMANN, supra note 32; VON BAR, supra note 32, at 227.  
 34. VON BAR, supra note 32, at 227. 
 35. Alexander Peukert, Sonstige Gegenstände im Rechtsverkehr, in 
UNKÖRPERLICHE GÜTER IM ZIVILRECHT 5, 95, 99 (Stefan Leible et al. eds., Mohr 
Siebeck 2011). 
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The same economic specifications apply to data. As a valuable 
property asset, data is an elementary subject of modern business re-
lations, which we therefore need to give somehow its rightful place 
in property law—whether or not it is corporeal in terms of physics. 
A stronger focus on parameters like controllability and manageabil-
ity may help to develop criteria to subsume data within property law 
and to constitute exclusive rights. Yet, through establishing these 
subject matters as factors, further problems arise.36 
2. Identifying European Commonalities 
The goal is to identify a common ground regarding an original 
European comprehension of a “thing” in terms of property law. 
Identifying commonalities is a demanding task, since no universal 
European property law has been established.37 Theoretically, we 
would need to examine and compare more than twenty-eight differ-
ent legal frameworks. This would go beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. We, therefore, narrow this study’s focus down to the major Eu-
ropean legal methods defining res incorporales. In the following, 
these concepts are summarized and contrasted whilst differences 
and similarities will be determined. The simple existence of legal 
concepts like personal property and possession themselves may just 
be the only mutuality. 
The inconsistency of the definition of the term “thing” within 
European property law will, therefore, be exemplarily illustrated. 
Austria38 and Scotland, for instance, have some of the most liberal 
approaches in Europe. Everything that can be distinguished from a 
person and is usable is legally defined as a “thing.” Ownership in-
cludes everything that belongs to someone, regardless of whether it 
                                                                                                             
 36. VON BAR, supra note 32, at 166. 
 37. For a comprehensive overview of recent literature on European property 
law, see Caroline S. Rupp, What’s New in European Property Law? 6 EUR. PROP. 
L. J. 87-110 (2017). 
 38. ABGB, supra note 31, at § 285. 
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is corporeal or not.39 Within this context, it is understandable to con-
stitute exclusive rights in reference to data.40 However, a conserva-
tive perspective would claim that the legal definition needs to be 
restricted to tangible goods. 
This problem also arises in Portugal and France. These countries 
provide quite broad definitions. The French Civil Code incorporates 
tangible and intangible “biens,” i.e., goods.41 In Portugal, anything 
that is an object of legal affairs can be treated as a “thing.”42 Despite 
this indifferent and general terminology, exclusive rights need some 
sort of corporality.43 Concerning this matter, even gas or energy are 
materialized and are, therefore, tangible “things” in Portugal.44 A 
comparable approach can be found in Greece. The civil law de-
mands some form of tangibility and controllability, whilst even nat-
ural powers, energy, or heat are considered a “thing,” if they are 
spatially controllable.45 
Switzerland, which uses similar terminology, recognizes that 
natural powers are a legal “thing” in certain constellations.46 In con-
trast, Germany assumes a rather narrow definition. The strict re-
quirement of a steady corporeality excludes everything that cannot 
                                                                                                             
 39. Id. at § 353. 
 40. See ELISABETH BERGER, REZEPTION IM LIECHTENSTEINISCHEN 
PRIVATRECHT UNTER BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DES ABGB 57 (LIT 
Verlag Münster 2011). 
 41. TERRÉ, supra note 30, at 43; GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, HAFTUNGSRECHT: 
STRUKTUR, PRINZIPIEN, SCHUTZBEREICH 334 (Springer Science & Business 
Media 2006).  
 42. CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE], Nov. 25, 1966, DL no. 47344/66, as 
amended, Art. 202 (Portugal) [hereinafter C.C.]. 
 43. See Art. 544 C. CIV. (Fr.); Art. 1302 C.C.; JOSÉ CARLOS DE MEDEIROS 
NÓBREGA, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES PORTUGIESISCHEN SACHENRECHTS 71 (V&R 
unipress GmbH 2015); Erwin Beysen, Frankreich, in 4 SACHENRECHT IN EUROPA 
177, 230 et seq. (Christian von Bar ed., Rasch 2001) [hereinafter SACHENRECHT 
IN EUROPA]. 
 44. DE MEREIROS NÓBREGA, supra note 43, at 71, 72; Maria Margarida 
R.A.C. de Seabra & Yanko Marcius de Alencar Xavier, Portugal, in 3 
SACHENRECHT IN EUROPA, supra note 43, at 177, 339, 347. 
 45. ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] Art. 947 (Greece). 
 46. SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 
1907, SR 210, RS 210, as amended, Art. 713 (Switz.). 
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be sensibly demarcated from other objects,47 like electricity.48 Own-
ership of incorporeal goods is, therefore, not possible.49 In Dutch 
civil law, these legal fundamentals are also indicated.50 Common 
law in the United Kingdom sets no high value on the distinction be-
tween tangible and intangible things.51 Instead, legal rights are usu-
ally not at all tied to any physical qualifications. Ownership or prop-
erty rights may be established on any type of tradeable good.52  
3. Interim Findings 
In summary, all European laws use the word “thing” or a com-
parable expression as a key term. Interpretations, which allow wide 
comprehensions of the term, exist in various European legal frame-
works. Commonalities on a superordinate level can be found in the 
appraisal of the “thing” as a potential property asset and the neces-
sity for controllability. Therefore, distinguishing between tangible 
and non-tangible property is not mandatory for an asset, like data, to 
be classified within the law of property. 
B. Ownership Rights in Europe 
Ownership is usually understood as an exclusive right—a right 
of domination over a determined thing allowing the owner to pos-
sess enjoy fruits and benefits, and to act with as it pleases. The owner 
                                                                                                             
 47. BGB § 90. 
 48. Christina Stresemann, § 90 BGB margin no. 1,5, in MÜNCHENER 
KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB (7th ed., Franz-Jürgen Säcker et al. eds., C.H. Beck 
2015). 
 49. BGB § 903. 
 50. Franz Nieper & Hendrik Plöger, Niederlande, in 3 SACHENRECHT IN 
EUROPA, supra note 43, at 149, 162; see BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [CIVIL 
CODE] (established in 1992), as amended, Art. 3:2 (Neth.). 
 51. MICHAEL BRIDGE ET AL., THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 1-11 (Sweet 
& Maxwell 2013); Andreas Rahmatian, A Comparison of German Moveable 
Property Law and English Personal Property Law, 3 J. COMP. L. 197, 202 (2008).  
 52. MATTHIAS LEHMANN, FINANZINSTRUMENTE: VOM WERTPAPIER- UND 
SACHENRECHT ZUM RECHT DER UNKÖRPERLICHEN VERMÖGENSGEGENSTÄNDE 
240, 241 (Mohr Siebeck 2009). 
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is also allowed to exclude others from any exposure.53  
1. Transparency: Publicity and Specificity 
Since ownership is of exclusive nature, both its original and de-
rivative acquisition requires some element of intersubjective percep-
tibility. To achieve universal recognition among legal entities it 
must be transparent to everybody concerned.54 Within the civil law 
tradition, this principle of publicity usually becomes manifest for 
moveable goods in their possession and for real property in its public 
registry.55 It is particularly important not only for the acquisition and 
transfer of ownership, but also for obtaining a lien or similar security 
interests.  
However, there are significantly different publicity requirements 
throughout Europe.56 While in Germany, for instance, chattel mort-
gage can be agreed upon quite confidentially, neither France nor 
England recognize non-possessory security interests without their 
explicit registration.57 The second element of transparency is speci-
ficity, i.e., only definable things can be subject to ownership rights.58 
This is a common necessity among the European jurisdictions, 
which particularly rules out ownership of unspecifiable and aggre-
gated assets. 
                                                                                                             
 53. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 563 (9th ed. 2009); BARRON’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 405 (6th ed. 2010). 
 54. SJEF VAN ERP & BRAM AKKERMANS, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON 
PROPERTY LAW 75 (Bloomsbury Publ’g 2012). 
 55. UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 102–108 (Greenwood Publ’g Group 2000). 
 56. See Dewi J.Y. Hamwijk, The puzzling concepts of publicity and posses-
sion: to the heart of property law, 1 EUR. PROP. L. J. 299–316 (2012) drawing a 
line to the Draft Common Frame of References, which attempts to combine basic 
rules of the law of obligations which most European legal systems hold in com-
mon. See Study Group on a European Civil Code & Research Group on EC Pri-
vate Law, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law—
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) Book IX (Proprietary security rights 
in movable assets) (Outline ed., Sellier 2009) https://perma.cc/DB9D-ML9U.  
 57. Arts. 2338, 2072 C. CIV. (Fr.); BRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 8–33; 
KATALIN LÉGRÁDI, MOBILIARSICHERHEITEN IN EUROPA 328 (Logos Verlag 
Berlin GmbH 2012); Rupp, supra note 37, at 95. 
 58. VAN ERP & AKKERMANS, supra note 54, at 76. 
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2. Acquisition of Ownership 
In general, ownership can be constituted either by derivative or 
by original, i.e., legal acquisition.59 Derivative acquisition means 
that the title of ownership is derived from a former owner; whereas, 
original acquisition implies a primary acquisition, in which case no 
previous owner existed. In this case, ownership is constituted by le-
gal statute. 
In comparison of European legal systems, both ways imply, in 
turn, various modes. First, ownership can be acquired derivatively 
by legal transaction, e.g., by contractual arrangement. Secondly, in 
certain cases and under strict conditions it may arise from legal ac-
quirement, such as inheritance or specification. Thirdly, there is ac-
quisition by sovereign acts like the award in a compulsory auction.60  
3. Criteria for Allocation in Case of Original Acquisition of 
Ownership 
Before ownership can be transferred derivatively, firstly, it must 
come into existence—the same applies to data ownership. From a 
comparative perspective, different criteria for allocation of owner-
ship can be identified. With regard to data ownership, it is crucial to 
focus on the prerequisites of acquisition of ownership by specifica-
tion, as an originator of data is comparable to the creator of a product 
in the broad sense. 
Specification means a creator produces a new tangible thing out 
of one or more components and acquires its ownership. Basically, 
the creator is the person who carries out the specification directly.61 
This legal consequence shall take effect no matter who owned the 
manufactured components before, provided that the value of the new 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. at 617. 
 60. See Gesetz über die Zwangsversteigerung und Zwangsverwaltung [ZVG] 
[Act on Enforced Auction and Receivership], Mar. 22, 1897, RGBL at 97, § 90 
(Ger.). 
 61. Ernest G. Lorenzen, Specification in the Civil Law, 35 YALE L. J. 29, 38 
(1925). 
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thing is not less valuable than the components.62 Therefore, the mo-
ment the creator acquires ownership by specification, former rights 
expire.  
In this context, the term “manufacturer” has to be understood in 
a broader sense, though. Its definition can depend on specific cir-
cumstances: not only the person who originally performs the trans-
formation can be meant. In German Law, for example, the manufac-
turer—and as legal consequence the person who acquires ownership 
of the new thing—can also be the one in whose interest and in whose 
name the production is carried out (i.e., the person who is principal 
in the legal sense).63 
This criterion for allocation is one of the older ones in the con-
text of legal allocation of data. The idea of assigning data ownership 
to the person who induced the collection, storage, and processing of 
data economically and in context of his business, follows an eco-
nomic approach. A similar approach can be found in the directive of 
the European Union on the protection of databases. By this directive, 
the maker of a database that shows there has been qualitatively, or 
quantitatively a substantial investment is provided an absolute right 
under copyright law.64 
4. Transfer of Ownership 
In comparison to the aforementioned aspects (i.e., publicity, 
specificity, and the acquisition of ownership), the European frame-
work of national property laws shows major discrepancies regarding 
the transfer of ownership. Taking this fact into account, it is essential 
                                                                                                             
 62. Rahmatian, supra note 51, at 197, 235.  
 63. Peter Bassenge, § 950 margin no. 6, in BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH: 
BGB (76th ed., Otto Palandt ed., Verlag C.H. Beck 2016). 
 64. European Parliament and Council Directive 96/9, Mar. 11, 1996, on the 
legal protection of databeses, Art. 7 § 1, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, 25 (EC) [hereinafter 
Directive 96/9]; Commented on by Silke von Lewinski, Database Directive, in 
EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY no. 9.7.1 et seq. (Michael M. Wal-
ter & Silke von Lewinski eds., Oxford U. Press 2010); see also Estelle Derclaye, 
The Database Directive, in EU COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY no. 9.31 et 
seq. (Irini Stamatoudi & Paul Torremans eds., Edward Elgar Publ’g 2014). 
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to give a brief overview of the various concepts of the transfer of 
ownership. On this occasion, we do not aim to outline a full expla-
nation of each member states’ property concept. We rather intend to 
explain the distinguishing characteristics with all due brevity, in or-
der not to shift the focus of our topic. This approach should not be 
an end in itself. Our idea is to outline a legal framework for a Euro-
pean concept of data ownership. Therefore, it is necessary to exam-
ine the potential existing legal barriers and requirements of such 
concept in the concrete legal area. 
A European concept of data ownership has to be implementable 
in the civil law systems of every member state. Thus, the authors 
have chosen to develop their proposition based on the principles of 
those jurisdictions that demand the strictest prerequisites when it 
comes to the original acquisition and transfer of physical property. 
The authors make the assumption that a concept compatible with 
those demands should work with the concepts of property law in all 
less restrictive member states as well. 
For starters, it should be pointed out that “ownership is in the 
standard repertoire of all codifications in the European Union.”65 On 
this basis, two major tendencies can be identified.66 Hereinafter, dif-
ferences and commonalities shall be illustrated in an exemplary 
fashion. 
a. Necessity of Delivery Combined with Contractual Agreement 
and/or Agreement in rem 
Legal systems in Germany and Greece require a proprietary 
agreement—i.e., an agreement in rem (dingliche Einigung)—and 
physical transfer or substitute for physical delivery of the good, 
which shall be assigned (traditio).67 In addition to the obligational 
                                                                                                             
 65. VON BAR, supra note 32, at 449. 
 66. VAN ERP & AKKERMANS, supra note 54, at 784; DIETER KRIMPHOVE, DAS 
EUROPÄISCHE SACHENRECHT 82 (EUL Verlag 2006) (applying a more sophisti-
cated systematization of six models). 
 67. KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66 at 88 et seq. 
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contractual agreement that contains the minimum content of con-
tractual conditions, e.g., performance and consideration (essentialia 
negotii), the parties have to conclude a bargain of disposition. With 
this agreement, normally fixed at the same time as the contractual 
agreement, the parties correspond in the transfer of property. A pe-
culiar feature of German law is that both agreements, contractual, 
and in rem become effective and exist independently of one another 
(principle of separation). The invalidity of one contract does not af-
fect the other (principle of abstract real conveyance). The publicity 
principle requires external recognizability of the change in the own-
ership structure, e.g., by transferring the direct possession of the de-
termined thing. Thus, the fulfillment of the transfer of ownership 
should be apparent for third parties. With the necessity of delivery, 
this concept follows the tradition principle.  
Compared with the rest of Europe, the German system of trans-
fer of ownership is especially the one that raises very high barriers 
with regards to data ownership. The fact that both agreements exist 
independently complicates legal classification of possible owner-
ship structures of data by enlarging the connecting factors. This is 
one reason why the discussion about data ownership is not in the 
least a German discussion.68 From this knowledge, the following 
hypothesis is taken as a basis: if it is possible to establish a concept 
of data ownership that is compatible with those legal systems having 
demands concerning their legal principles that are difficult to com-
bine with the nature of data, this concept, as well, might be adopta-
ble to legal systems with less barriers in this regard. 
 In countries such as Austria, Hungary, Poland, or Switzerland, 
the transfer of ownership requires a proprietary agreement and the 
delivery of the assigned good as well, but it is based on the principle 
                                                                                                             
 68. See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on the 
Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, at 23 
n.108, COM (2017) 9 final (Jan. 10, 2017) [hereinafter Commission Staff Working 
Document on the Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the European Data 
Economy]. 
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of causa.69 The principle of causa implies an inevitable link between 
the contractual agreement and the proprietary agreement. Notwith-
standing the principle of separation, there is no effectiveness of the 
two agreements without one another. If for any reason the contrac-
tual agreement is ineffective, ownership is retransferred automati-
cally. 
Some countries—e.g., Spain and the Netherlands—do not re-
quire any proprietary agreement at all.70 In this case, transfer of 
ownership is executed by the conclusion of a treaty (obligational 
agreement) and the delivery of the thing. Therefore, the transfer of 
ownership primarily depends on the question whether the obliga-
tional agreement is effective or not.71 
b. Principle of Consensus 
In France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, Portugal, and Bulgaria 
there is a completely different approach to the transfer of ownership, 
as it is not based on any delivery but the principle of consensus. It 
only requires an effective understanding of the legal transaction.72 
Neither a further proprietary agreement nor the delivery of the sold 
good is necessary.73 In case of an ineffective contract, the ownership 
is retransferred automatically to the former owner. It is noteworthy, 
that there is basically no element of public disclosure. Few excep-
tions only exist in the case of obligations to purchase of fungible 
                                                                                                             
 69. KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66, at 88 et seq.; for Austrian law, see VAN ERP 
& AKKERMANS, supra note 54, at 798. 
 70. KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66, at 103 et seq.; for Dutch law, see VAN ERP & 
AKKERMANS, supra note 54, at 795. 
 71. KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66, at 102. 
 72. Erwin Beysen, Frankreich, in 4 SACHENRECHT IN EUROPA, supra note 43, 
at 239; KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66, at 109. 
 73. Jakob Fortunat Stagl, Der Eigentumsübergang beim Kauf von 
beweglichen Sachen - Gedanken über die Methode der Rechtsvereinheitlichung 
am Beispiel der Study Group on a European Civil Code, in JAHRBUCH JUNGER 
ZIVILRECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLER 2004 at 369 (Andrea Tietze et al. eds., Richard 
Boorberg Verlag 2005); see Arts. 1583, 1138, 711 C. CIV. (Fr.). 
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goods, elective obligation or goods to be manufactured. Those ex-
ceptions require a further agreement appropriating the goods to the 
contract. 
In contrast to this “pure principle of consensus”74 or “solo con-
sensus rule,”75 the legal systems of Great Britain, the Czech Repub-
lic, and Lithuania combine both elements of the tradition principle 
and the principle of consensus.76 In detail, the concrete procedure of 
selling tangible goods depends on the underlying legal transaction. 
All purchase agreements, as well as manufacturing agreements, fall 
under the Sale of Goods Act and the Consumer Rights Act. The only 
and sufficient condition for the transfer of ownership is the contrac-
tual agreement. According to ss. 17 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act 
“the property . . . is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties 
to the contract intend it to be transferred.” In this regard, the British 
system is comparable to the aforementioned model. However, it var-
ies in the parties’ possibility of determining the date of the transfer 
of ownership. Thereby, it enables temporal division of the conclu-
sion of the contract and the acquisition of ownership. Outside the 
scope of the Sale of Goods Act—for example in case of donation, 
loan, or barter contracts—the general law of contract is applicable 
and the transfer of ownership additionally requires the delivery of 
the thing. 
c. Non-Regulation in Scandinavia  
There are a few European jurisdictions—particularly in Scandi-
navia77—that do not provide a uniform system for transferring own-
ership rights. In countries like Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
and Iceland, only certain aspects are covered by existing law of 
                                                                                                             
 74. KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66, at 109 et seq. 
 75. VAN ERP & AKKERMANS, supra note 54, at 788. 
 76. KRIMPHOVE, supra note 66, at 120 et seq. (“differentiating principle of 
consensus”). 
 77. Id. at 132 et seq. (“principle of consensus of successive single effect”). 
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property. Those aspects indicate a similarity to the principle of con-
sensus. However, by not regulating the system of transfer of owner-
ship extensively, the legal systems are able to handle new develop-
ments more flexibly than other systems by adapting the law of prop-
erty in one particular case. 
5. Interim Findings 
The analysis of European national property laws shows some 
major differences on the whole, but, nonetheless, commonalities 
within some crucial dogmatic legal issues. European law of property 
is, therefore, in principle, receptive to a joint approach regarding the 
question of data ownership. 
IV. DATA-SPECIFIC ISSUES 
So far, we have outlined the foundations of European property 
law and demonstrated that there is little legislation that particularly 
addresses data as an intangible asset. However, we have not paid 
close attention to the practical implications of this shortcoming, 
even though in praxis, the lack of data-specific regulation certainly 
raises quite a number of problems. We have picked some examples 
to draw further conclusions (i.e., data theft, bankruptcy, and whether 
data can be subject to a lien). 
A. Data Theft  
Whereas many national legal systems provide special sections 
for data theft,78 the question whether the theft of data can be also 
classified as “usual” theft is of higher interest for the development 
                                                                                                             
 78. See, e.g., STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 202a, May 15, 
1871, RGBL at 127, as amended (Ger.). 
2018] DATA OWNERSHIP & PROPERTY RIGHTS 347 
 
 
 
of a data ownership. Since most European member states’ legisla-
tions determine that only a physical thing79 can be stolen, it is ex-
tremely relevant whether or not the definition of things can also con-
tain non-tangible assets. 
Luxembourg’s highest court in civil and criminal matters, the 
Cour de cassation, rendered an important decision in 2014 on the 
matter.80 In the criminal case, the employee of a bank had down-
loaded and photocopied confidential documents that belonged to the 
bank. Later, he presented these documents before an employment 
tribunal as evidence for gross misconduct of his former employer. 
In response, the bank filed a criminal complaint inter alia for theft.  
In the prior instance, the court of appeal81 had differentiated be-
tween the downloading of electronic data and the photocopying of 
paper documents. For the aim of this article the violation of the 
bank’s copyrights by the latter act are secondary, as well as the vio-
lation of professional secrecy.82 As far as the downloading was con-
cerned, the court held that the defendant did not commit the crime 
of theft, because an object of theft could only be an item of moveable 
corporeal property. According to the court of appeal, data could not 
be seen as a physical subject and, therefore, it could not be stolen. 
Basically, the Cour de cassation followed the court of appeal’s 
distinction but partly overruled its decision. It made use of a wider 
interpretation of the definition of theft: “[E]lectronic data stored on 
the bank’s server and which is legally its exclusive property consti-
tute incorporeal property which can be apprehended by way of 
downloading.” Furthermore, according to the court, sec. 461 Lux-
embourg Criminal Code would not make a distinction between cor-
poreal or incorporeal objects of theft.  
                                                                                                             
 79. In French, a thing is “chose” and in German, it is “Sache.” 
 80. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], Apr. 3, 2014, 6458/10/CD 
(Lux.). 
 81. Cour d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal], Luxembourg City, July 10, 2013, 
395/13 X (Lux.). 
 82. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, according to the Cour de cas-
sation, the photocopying qualifies as theft.  
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This means that electronic data stored on a server qualifies as a 
thing that can be stolen. By this decision, Luxemburg’s Cour de cas-
sation broke with the court of appeal’s case law.83  
B. Bankruptcy 
As more and more data services shift from local or on-premises 
solutions to cloud-based setups, private individuals and corporate 
enterprises start to ask themselves, what would happen to “their” 
data if a cloud service provider went bankrupt? Once a cloud service 
provider shuts down its servers due to financial problems, customers 
can neither access nor recover their data. Despite the disastrous con-
sequences, only few jurisdictions pay attention to this urgent prob-
lem so far. Again, the underlying problem seems to be that storage 
devices are easily sizeable as a “thing;” whereas, the data itself may 
be scattered across innumerous physical resources and, therefore, 
not tangible.  
Usually, contracting parties have a right to claim for separation 
and recovery of assets not belonging to the bankrupt estate. How-
ever, this right of separation is closely linked to the above-men-
tioned principle of transparency, which requires an asset to be deter-
minable. This means that customer data must be capable of being 
separated from other objects in order to be (re-)vindicated. In digital 
environments this obviously poses a problem. But thanks to virtual-
ization, data clusters can actually be separated depending on the cus-
tomers to whom they are assigned. 
Against this background, most bankruptcy laws allow for a right 
to claim back. Unfortunately, some jurisdictions limit (re-)vindica-
tion to tangible goods, as does Switzerland for example.84 
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Luxemburg, on the contrary, leads a different path. Just recently, 
it introduced a specific right to claim back intangible and non-fun-
gible movable assets—i.e., data from bankrupt companies. For this 
purpose, article 567 of the Code of Commerce requires: 
− that the bankrupt company must not be the legal owner of 
the data but only hold it, 
− that the claimant must have entrusted the data to the bankrupt 
company or be the legal owner of it and 
− that the data must be separable from the other assets of the 
company at the time of the opening of bankruptcy proceed-
ings.85 
Clearly, such a precise provision comes along with a great deal 
of legal certainty. Notwithstanding this advantage, most jurisdic-
tions see no need for specific regulation as they allow for (re-)vin-
dication of intangible assets under general provisions. In fact, this 
laissez-faire approach carries a certain risk, since it lacks data-spe-
cific prerequisites for claims.  
C. Data and (Common Law) Lien 
Closely related to the issue of how data is dealt with legally in 
case of bankruptcy is the question whether data can be subject to a 
lien. By extension, both subject areas discuss data as a possible eco-
nomic security. 
Within the boundaries of the Common Law, the English Court 
of Appeal assessed this exact question in a recent case in 2014.86 For 
                                                                                                             
 85. Nonofficial translation by Vincent Wellens, Patrice Vanderbeeken & Ty-
cho de Graaf, Proposal for a Right to Claim Back Data from Bankrupt Cloud 
Computing Providers, LEXOLOGY, https://perma.cc/PEH7-KDKD; for further 
commentary on the provision, see Sjef van Erp, Ownership of Digital Assets?, 5 
EUR. PROP. L. J. 73–76 (2016). 
 86. Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media Ltd. [2014] EWCA 
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sponse Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media Ltd.]; commented on by van Erp, supra 
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companies working with digital assets like customer data, the sud-
den loss of access to their data is likely to cause catastrophic results. 
Therefore, it is quite surprising that the legal matter has only just 
been decided by the courts. Current law in Britain states that a per-
son who has possession of another person’s property with the pur-
pose of altering or improving the property can claim a possessory 
lien over that property in case of an unpaid debt. A well-known ex-
ample is a car mechanic or a dry cleaner retaining possession of the 
client’s goods. Incidentally, this legal mechanism applies to nearly 
every European legal framework.  
In concreto, the legal matter in Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam 
Business Media Ltd. 87 questioned if it were possible to assert a com-
mon law possessory lien over a publisher of magazines’ database 
containing subscriber’s information now withheld by Datateam. The 
data was updated regularly; up to hundreds of alterations were made 
daily. 
The Court of Appeal overruled the lower court and held that 
within the common law, a lien was only possible over tangible prop-
erty; information stored in an electronic database could not be con-
sidered property that one can possess. Therefore, the court ruled that 
Datateam was not entitled to retain the data until outstanding in-
voices were paid.  
Potent arguments by Datateam stressing the urgent need to ex-
tend the scope of lien were overruled. Judge Floyd emphasized the 
distinction between information itself, the physical medium, like a 
server for instance, and the rights to which the information gives 
rise, like intellectual property rights. One of the most relevant deci-
sions the court based its verdict on is OBG Ltd. v. Allan.88 This case 
rose, for the first time, the legal issue whether existing law should 
be applied to intangible objects. The trial court accepted an analogy 
                                                                                                             
 87. See Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media Ltd., supra note 86, 
at recital no. 83. 
 88. OBG Ltd. v. Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, [2007] 2 WLR 920 
(appeal taken from Eng.).  
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based on the presumption that the essence of possession is physical 
control combined with the intention to exclude others.  
The Court of Appeal’s decision highlights the fact that contrac-
tual status does not guarantee an appropriate degree of legal cer-
tainty in the long run. Further judicial or legislative action is still 
needed. Lord Justice Moore-Bick stated that it was a matter for Par-
liament to resolve. Contrarily, Lord Justice Davis argued that the 
court should resist the attraction to leave the common law lien stuck 
in its outdated origins, but to change it to suit a 21st century appli-
cation, due to the unintended consequences that would follow such 
a verdict: for instance, changes within the law of theft. Interestingly, 
the court even states the rights and duties that arise in relation to data 
in a digitized business world. 
Still, the judgement effectively limits modern data service com-
panies, who are providing IT maintenance, to collect outstanding 
debt. They are then left in a remarkably less favorable position than 
traditional service providers like the aforementioned car manufac-
turer or dry cleaner. Therefore, the verdict not only obstructs start-
up innovation, but also data-driven businesses. The court fails to 
provide sufficient argument for why putting IT service companies 
in a worse position is justified.  
However, the nature of intellectual property itself needs to be 
taken in perspective also. Database rights follow the European data-
base directive from 1996, which clearly states what rights are to be 
given to a database owner. A right of lien or any other similar right 
is not included. 
V. DIMENSIONS OF DATA OWNERSHIP 
As established above, we discovered a striking discrepancy be-
tween the economic and legal status quo in handling data as an asset. 
352 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 11 
 
 
 
As legal issues of data are increasingly considered in economic con-
texts, its value comes to the forefront.89 Thus, considering that data 
is a de facto trade good, the lack of data-specific regulation is truly 
unsatisfactory. Against this background, we argue that the law 
should follow the economic reality and, therefore, address legal un-
certainty.  
In the following, we will further specify our property law ap-
proach by pointing out criteria for the assignment of data ownership 
and contouring dimensions of such an exclusive right in rem. As the 
debate on whether there is a fundamental need for data ownership is 
intensifying,90 our approach takes up recent European impulses and 
attempts to contribute to a critical discussion by taking economic 
considerations as a basis. 
A. European Scope 
Before we proceed to substantiate the dimensions of a compre-
hensive data ownership concept, it is necessary to emphasize the 
crux of the problem of creating such a property right on a European 
scale. As outlined above, the member states have widely different 
models for acquisition, transfer, and scope of ownership rights. 
At the lower end of the scale, we have the principle of consensus, 
which is applied in the legal systems of states such as France, Bel-
gium, Italy, and Portugal, for example. This principle solely requires 
a contractual agreement that covers the details of data ownership and 
creates a sufficient legal framework. Thus, all performances are laid 
                                                                                                             
 89. This thesis is confirmed by the fact that, in the last years, the European 
Court of Justice had to judge data law issues in context of commercial or compe-
tition law increasingly often, see, e.g., Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. 
OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039; Case T-201/04, Mi-
crosoft v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601; Case C-170/13, Huawei Technolo-
gies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp., ZTE Deutschland GmbH, 2015 ECLI: 
EU:C:2015:477. 
 90. For an overview of the current academic debate, see Commission Staff 
Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the Euro-
pean Data Economy, supra note 68, at 33 et seq. 
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down in one contract. The change of ownership, rights of use, ac-
cess, and exploitation rights as well as defensive rights can be sub-
stantiated precisely. For that reason, according to the principle of 
consensus, the question of data ownership does not pose a major 
problem.  
At the top end of the scale, we find the principle of abstract real 
conveyance combined with the principle of separation. It particu-
larly applies to Germany and Greece. With the necessity of both an 
obligational contractual and proprietary agreement, these principles 
provide the highest level of requirements for assigning ownership 
rights. For this reason, the academic and governmental debate is 
much livelier in Germany than in other EU member states where the 
law of property follows the principle of consensus.91  
Those are the systemic differences we already discussed. How-
ever, our analysis shall not be limited to identifying obstacles in 
drafting a European approach to data ownership. Instead, the aim is 
to find common ground. For this purpose, i.e., establishing a trans-
national data ownership right, one would consider a European regu-
lation or directive as the obvious solution. The problem is that this 
is an unfeasible option because—according to the principle of con-
ferred powers, one of the key EU principles92—the law of property 
is an exclusive matter of the member states.93 Therefore, a purely 
theoretical concept requires finding the lowest common denomina-
tor within the various models of ownership in Europe. Hence, we 
                                                                                                             
 91. This thesis is substantiated by the recently published Commission Staff 
Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the Euro-
pean Data Economy, supra note 68, at 22 et seq., which reveals the current dis-
cussion about data ownership within the EU boundaries. Compared with the rest 
of Europe, data ownership issues have been discussed variously in academia and 
in government as well. No concrete regulatory initiatives have been launched so 
far. 
 92. According to the principle of conferral, the EU shall act only within the 
limits of the competences conferred upon it by the member states. 
 93. For a constitutional perspective on property law in the internal market, 
see Bram Akkermans, European Union Constitutional Property Law: Searching 
for Foundations for the Allocation of Regulatory Competences, in WHO DOES 
WHAT? ON THE ALLOCATION OF REGULATORY COMPETENCES IN EUROPEAN 
PRIVATE LAW 177–210 (Bram Akkermans et al. eds., Intersentia 2015). 
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opt for the following methodology: if we developed an approach that 
meets all requirements of the German and Greek legal system, a for-
tiori it would also work in all of the other legal systems. Against this 
background we hold on to the strictest, top-end requirements (as out-
lined above). 
B. Potential Criteria for Assigning Data Ownership Rights  
1. Open Data Concepts 
One approach to deal with the legal classification of data is the 
use of open data concepts. Strictly speaking, open data does not fa-
cilitate the particular allocation of data to a legal subject, but rather 
has the opposite effect, by “setting data free.”94 Nonetheless, open 
data models are becoming increasingly popular amongst European 
governments and must, therefore, be taken into account. 
France just recently passed specific open data regulations95: it is 
one of only a few European member states to have regulated on this 
issue. The idea is to “enhance the circulation of data and 
knowledge.”96 This places France in an improved competitive posi-
tion, as it is facing the challenges presented by the advancing digital 
economy.97 Under specific conditions, the new legislation requires 
commercial companies to provide access to data for purposes of re-
utilization. This particularly concerns data acquired in the procure-
ment process, commercial data for the creation of official statistics, 
data generated in the energy production and distribution process 
                                                                                                             
 94. Matt West, Open Data: 3 Principles for Setting Data Free, TREEHOUSE 
BLOG (Aug. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/V3MC-YL7E; for visions of open data, 
see BRIDGETTE WESSELS ET AL., OPEN DATA AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 45 
et seq. (Amsterdam U. Press 2017). 
 95. Loi 2016-1321 du 7 oct. 2016 pour une République numérique [Law 
2016-1321 of Oct. 7, 2016 on a Digital Republic], Journal Officiel de la Répu-
blique Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 8, 2016, no. 0235. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See the proposal of the law, Projet de loi pour une République mumé-
rique, Assemblée nationale, no. 3318, Dec. 9, 2015, https://perma.cc/HEJ3-
BDK9. 
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and, finally, data relating to changes in real estate ownership.98 The 
Estonian government has gone even further by introducing the idea 
that the free movement of knowledge and data should be established 
as a fifth freedom, next to the four pre-existing internal market free-
doms of the European Union.99 Also, Finland has just recently com-
menced an open data initiative: the new Transport Code proposes 
that essential data—particularly passenger data—from all transport 
services shall be made open.100 
Although open data concepts have beneficial effects,101 due to 
the continued use of data within secondary economic business mod-
els, it complicates the explicit legal allocation of data or may even 
prevent it.  
2. Data and Data Carriers 
Another approach would be to focus on the medium storing the 
data, assuming that the data carrier itself constitutes data ownership. 
This assumption acknowledges the technological fact that digital 
data cannot be accessed without the physical medium.102 Thus, a 
concept that understands data and its carrier as an entity is anything 
                                                                                                             
 98. Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and 
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 22 et seq. 
 99. The ideas were presented by the Estonian President Mr. Ilves, see De-
bates, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Feb. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/BR27-4KTT. 
 100. Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications Press Release, 
Transport Code Progresses, a Solution Found (Sept. 21, 2016), https://perma 
.cc/UZH2-U4YC. 
 101. For further discussion, see OECD, Data-Driven Innovation—Big Data 
for Growth and Well-Being at 186 (2015), https://perma.cc/G6CV-BEVL; Gerrit 
Hornung & Thilo Goeble, “Data Ownership” im vernetzten Automobil, 31(4) 
COMPUTER UND RECHT [CR] 265, 272 (2015) (Ger.); see also the “free flow of 
data initiative” planned by the European Commission in the Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single Market Strategy 
for Europe, at 4.1, COM (2015) 192 final (May 16, 2015). 
 102. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jul. 10, 2015, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 317, 2016 (Ger.); 
Landesarbeitsgericht Chemnitz [LAG] [Higher Labour Court] Jan. 17, 2007, 
MMR 426 (2008) (Ger.). 
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but far-fetched. This approach facilitates the objectification of digi-
tal data and provides a tangible starting point for a right in rem. Le-
gal reification of data can, therefore, be derived by using the data 
carrier as a point of reference for the legal allocation of data. At first 
glance, this approach would constitute a transparent and comprehen-
sible solution. However, the economic value of data is not neces-
sarily represented by the ownership of the data carrier. Eventually, 
regarding the current use of industrial data, the originator of data and 
the proprietor of the data carrier are rarely the same legal subject.103  
3. Originator of Data 
Perhaps the most significant approach regarding the discussion 
of data ownership as an asset focuses on the originator of data 
(scriptor).104 In this context, the scriptor would be the person who 
directly initiates the data processing and is, therefore, closest to the 
matter. 
In fact, this concept is one of the earliest and most sophisticated 
approaches. Its dogmatic rationale can be found within the German 
Criminal Law, for example. Sections 202a and 303a of the German 
Criminal Code protect the authority to dispose of data as a legal as-
set.105 Therefore, we may draw the conclusion through analogy that 
                                                                                                             
 103. E.g., cloud service providers such as Amazon Web Services provide data 
storage to customers. However, it is the customers who generate and process data. 
 104. Jürgen Welp, Datenveränderung (§ 303a StGB) Teil 1, INFORMATIK UND 
RECHT [IUR] 443, 447 (1988); Thomas Hoeren, Dateneigentum – Versuch einer 
Anwendung von § 303a StGB im Zivilrecht, MMR 486, 486 et seq. (2013); see 
Oberlandesgericht Nuremberg [OLG Nuremberg] [Higher Regional Court of 
Nuremberg], Jan. 23, 2013, 2013 ZD 282 (Ger). 
 105. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: Drucksachen und Protokolle [BT] 16/3656, 9 
(11) (Ger.); DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: Drucksachen und Protokolle [BT] 10/5058, 
28 et seq. (Ger.); THEODOR LENCKNER, STGB-KOMMENTAR § 202a no. 1 (29th 
ed., Adolf Schönke & Horst Schröder eds. 2014); JÜRGEN-PETER GRAF, 
MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM STGB § 202a no. 3 (3th ed., Wolfgang Joecks ed. 
2017); Jan Eichelberger, Sasser, Blaster, Phatbot & Co. - alles halb so schlimm? 
- Ein Überblick über die strafrechtliche Bewertung von Computerschädlingen, 
MMR 594, 594 (2004); Monika Frommel, Das Zweite Gesetz zur Bekämpfung 
der Wirtschaftskriminalität, JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG [JUS] 667, 668 (1987).  
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data may also be subject to the power of disposition as a right in 
rem.106 
At first instance, this train of thought allows for a comprehensi-
ble constitution of data ownership, due to the fact that this method-
ology is based upon objective criteria. Yet, such a rigorous approach 
shows one substantial weakness: it disregards the importance of the 
economical initiator of any modern data acquisition and data gener-
ating process. The initiator—as a rule—is not necessarily restricted 
to the originator of data.  
Additionally, it is arguable whether an approach that—in es-
sence—draws upon copyright law assumptions can be expedient 
with regard to modern data processing. We should question whether 
one can speak of a personal connection between the originator and 
his data—like the connection between an author and his work. 
4. Economic Rationale 
As stated above, the acceptance of data ownership is closely re-
lated to—if not fully dependent on—economic interests.107 Huge in-
vestments are often necessary, to create, manage, and store data for 
operating purposes.108 For example, sensors supervise the function 
of industrial plants and generate millions of data assets for fault di-
agnosis, maintenance, and automatic purposes.109 It is by no means 
                                                                                                             
 106. See Herbert Zech, “Industrie 4.0” – Rechtsrahmen für eine 
Datenwirtschaft im Digitalen Binnenmarkt, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND 
URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 1151, 1159 (2015); Herbert Zech, Information as a 
tradable commodity, in EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE 
MARKET 51, 51–79 (Alberto de Franceschi ed., 2016) [hereinafter EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET]; Karl-Heinz Fezer, 
Dateneigentum, MMR 3, 4 (2017).  
 107. See Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and 
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 34–35. 
 108. See Cindy LaChapelle, The Cost of Data Storage and Management: 
Where is it Headed in 2016?, DATA CENTER JOURNAL (March 10, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/LL5W-6C7X. 
 109. This trend is also known as Industry 4.0, see Cornelius Baur & Dominik 
Wee, Manufacturing’s Next Act, MCKINSEY&COMPANY (June 2015), 
https://perma.cc/SN6A-JFKM. For a legal discussion on industrial data, see An-
dreas Wiebe, A Protection of Industrial Data – A New Property Right for the Dig-
ital Economy?, 65 GRUR INT. 877 (2016). 
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a matter of fact that the owner of the data carrier or the machine is 
necessarily identical with the subject who has original informational 
and economic interests.110 Within the scope of contracting, data pro-
cessing, leasing models or cloud computing, the client must be 
granted the predominant and legitimate interests in the exclusive ac-
cess and use of data.111 Third parties—including the contractor—
shall be excluded from the opportunity to take note of the stored and 
processed data or the acceptance of property rights. Therefore, data 
ownership must take the contractual agreements and informational 
interests referring to the process of collection, recording, and organ-
ization into account.  
Hereafter, a data ownership concept must be tied to the legal 
subject who primarily initiates the process of data recording and pro-
cessing by economical, technical, and informational means.112  
One potential criterion could also be allocated in the resources 
invested in the creation of the relevant data. This means taking fac-
tors like manpower or capital expenditure into account. In economic 
life, investments of this sort are mostly done by two different play-
ers. Firstly, the producer of the sensor-equipped device or tool that 
actually generates the data and, secondly, the economic operator that 
utilizes the device and has already funded the purchase price. His 
economic objective is the amortization of his investment.113 Admit-
tedly, this split situation does raise conceptual issues regarding the 
                                                                                                             
 110. Herbert Zech, Information as a Tradable Commodity, in EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET, supra note 106, at 51, 75; 
Maximilian Becker, Schutzrechte an Maschinendaten und die Schnittstelle zum 
Personendatenschutz, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL-HEINZ FEZER ZUM 70. 
GEBURTSTAG 815, 825 (Wolfgang Büscher et al. eds. 2016).  
 111. See Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and 
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 16 et seq. 
 112. For an overview referring general legal protection of data, see Todd Vare 
& Michael Mattioli, Big Business, Big Government and Big Legal Questions, 243 
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 46 (2014). 
 113. With this comprehensible explanation: Commission Staff Working Docu-
ment on the Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the European Data Econ-
omy, supra note 68, at 33 et seq.; with a reference to Herbert Zech, Information 
as a Tradable Commodity, in EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW AND THE DIGITAL 
SINGLE, supra note 106, at 51, 75; Becker, supra note 110, at 815, 825. 
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identification of a specific data owner and is, therefore, too difficult 
to apply.114 
5. Interim Findings 
It is worth specifying at this point that the legal allocation of data 
to an owner in terms of property law has to be considered a work in 
progress. Still, several promising, coherent, and comprehensible ap-
proaches do exist already. Whichever is adopted, it must put infor-
mational, technological, and especially economical means at the 
center of any further consideration.  
C. Rights of Use and Defensive Rights 
Following a property law approach, we need to distinguish be-
tween two dimensions. As Section 903 of the German Civil Code 
states: “The owner of a thing may, to the extent that a statute or third-
party rights do not conflict with this, deal with the thing at his dis-
cretion and exclude others from every influence.” Similarly, article 
5:1 of the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek specifies: 
(1) Ownership is the most extensive right, which a person 
can have in a corporeal object.  
(2) To the exclusion of everybody else, the owner is free to 
use the object provided that this use does not violate the 
rights of others and that it respects the limitations based 
upon statutory rules and rules of unwritten law.115 
On the one hand, the owner of a thing is entitled to deal with his 
property at his discretion (positive rights of use). On the other hand, 
he may exclude others from any kind of interference (negative rights 
of defense). These two competences find their limits in the rights of 
third parties. 
                                                                                                             
 114. European Commission, High Level Conference on Building a Data Econ-
omy: Summary of the Discussion, at 3 (Oct. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc 
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 115. Translation by VAN ERP & AKKERMANS, supra note 54, at 382. 
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Against this systematic background, we need to assess what kind 
of rights a data ownership could and/or should encompass. In order 
to assess this question, we will discuss both positive rights (i.e., data 
usage) and negative competences regarding secondary claims such 
as damages or restitution. In the following, we will illustrate poten-
tial outlines for such competences from a proprietary point of view. 
1. Access Rights 
First, we need to clarify whether or not data property is tied to 
exclusive or non-exclusive access rights. Exclusive data access 
would grant the data owner the right to exclude third parties from 
the opportunity to take notice of the stored information. In contrast 
to that, non-exclusive access would be required to balance the con-
flicting interests of the owner and third parties on a case-by-case 
basis. Such a need to balance interests on an individual basis cannot 
be considered a feasible solution regarding the practical significance 
of data-driven business models, particularly when taking into ac-
count the need for legal certainty. Therefore, ownership as a concept 
within the law of property necessitates that the data owner be 
granted the right of exclusive access.116 However, this argument 
shall only apply insofar as legal provisions do not state otherwise, 
for instance if data protection law is applicable and third parties are 
not explicitly authorized to generate and access the personal data.117 
Thus, a data owner generally has an exclusive right to access his 
data regardless of whether third parties process it on his informa-
tional, technological or economical behalf.118 The owner’s access 
right comes along with the third party’s duty to tolerate and facilitate 
                                                                                                             
 116. Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and 
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 33 et seq. 
 117. Regarding the right of access within intellectual property law, see Dan 
Wielsch, The Differentiation of Property, 5 EUR. PROP. L. J. 77, 96 et seq. (2016). 
 118. See for instance in data protection law, GDPR Art. 15 § 1, which states 
that the data subject shall have the right to obtain, among further information, 
access to the personal data being processed. It is also provided by GDPR Art. 20 
§ 1, which gives the data subject the right to receive the personal data concerning 
him or her in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format. 
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the enforcement of access claims. The access right shall be accom-
panied by the right to reproduce, i.e., copy identical datasets to en-
sure the access to data, considered as its informational basis.  
2. Use and Exploitation 
Secondly, we need to define the contours of a data owner’s right 
to use and exploit data. From an economic perspective, it is fair to 
state that these competences are considered the most relevant since 
many business models are based on an extensive exploitation of 
data. After all, due to the lowering of switching costs, promotion of 
competition between data services,119 and the exchange of economic 
goods, a great need for data portability (i.e., the movement, copying, 
or transfer)120 can be concluded. 
From a legal perspective, a specific portability right has already 
been established within data protection law. Article 20 of the GDPR 
states that one “shall have the right to receive the personal data con-
cerning him, which he has provided to a controller, in a structured, 
commonly used and machine-readable format and have the right to 
transmit those data to another controller.”121 In this context, it is im-
portant to consider that the term “provide” covers a broad scope of 
applications122 and nearly all kinds of data. This concept increases 
legal certainty substantially and indicates the general demand for 
data portability to be initiated on behalf of a data holder in case of a 
lack of comprehensive and fair contractual agreement.123 
                                                                                                             
 119. Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely 
Reduces Consumer Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique, 72 MD. L. REV. 335, 
338 (2013). 
 120. Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and 
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 46. 
 121. GDPR Art. 20 § 7. 
 122. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the right to data 
portability, adopted on 13 December 2016, 41(3) DATENSCHUTZ UND 
DATENSICHERHEIT [DuD] 136, 136 (2017). 
 123. Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and 
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 47. 
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Economic exploitation of data raises yet another question: the 
fruits of the data—in another words, its economic benefit—need to 
be allocated to someone in a legal sense. Originally, the data owner 
should be entitled to profit from the outcome of processed infor-
mation. For example, he should have the right of further analysis 
and processing. This dogmatic assumption is supported by existing 
national law in Europe124 according to which fruits of a thing or 
rights are assigned to the respective owner and entitled legal per-
sona.125 Consequently, the owner of a smart car would be assigned 
the data and informational value he generates, unless statutory or 
contractual provisions state different assignations. 
Finally, a data ownership should provide the legal option to 
transfer single competences to others.126 If the owner withholds the 
original dataset but transmits identical copies to contract partners, 
particular exploitation rights might be granted. This means that sin-
gle ownership rights can be licensed,127 like the copying of data or 
transfer of informational and economic benefit. An exclusive prop-
erty right on data, supplemented with licensing models, would facil-
itate the dealing with original and copied datasets and, therefore, 
strengthens data-driven business models as well as legal certainty in 
general.  
3. Defensive Rights 
The concept of data ownership furthermore grants a set of de-
fensive rights to protect the right holder against impairment by third 
                                                                                                             
 124. E.g., BGB §§ 953, 99. 
 125. Lambert Grosskopf, Rechte an privat erhobenen Geo- und 
Telemetriedaten, IP-RECHTSBERATER [IPRB] 259, 261 (2011). 
 126. BENEDIKT BUCHNER, INFORMATIONELLE SELBSTBESTIMMUNG IM 
PRIVATRECHT 276 et seq. (Mohr Siebeck 2006). 
 127. Parallels to this concept can be found in the Copyright Law, see Gesetz 
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Copyright and Related Rights], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL 1273, as amended, §§ 29, 31 
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parties.128 On a first level, a data ownership as a right in rem gives 
the data originator the right of disposal. The data owner, therefore, 
serves as legal point of reference regarding the integrity of data in 
terms of property law. This basically means that he is entitled to deal 
with the relevant data however he pleases as a right in rem.129 There-
fore, he shall be entitled to access and exploit or even delete the rel-
evant data as explained above. On a second level, the integrity of 
data has to be proprietary against third parties. Eventually, the data 
originator needs protection against impairment and, therefore, enti-
tlement to enforce legal action against unauthorized access and ex-
ploitation of his data. Thus, utilization of data by any outside party 
is prevented erga omnes, independent of contractual agreements. 
Modification or destruction as an expression of compromising 
data integrity could be legally prohibited inter alia through tort law 
as a fully recognized right in rem.130 Still, such protection would not 
include copying or the mere use of data, since such activity would 
lead to an unintended monopolization of data.131 
Specifically, legal protection could be integrated within civil 
procedural law as, for instance, the right to seek injunctions in order 
to prevent further exploitation, the right to have products built and 
                                                                                                             
 128. Herbert Zech, Information as a Tradable Commodity, in EUROPEAN 
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47(7) INT’L. REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. [IIC] 759, 760 (2016); Wiebe, 
supra note 109, at 877, 880 et seq. In German tort law such a legal classification 
is already recognised on a broad scale, see Michael Bartsch, Daten als Rechtsgut 
nach § 823 Absatz 1 BGB, in RECHT DER DATEN UND DATENBANKEN IM 
UNTERNEHMEN 297, 300 (Isabell Conrad et al. eds., Dr. Otto Schmidt 2014); Bun-
desgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 2, 1996, 133 BGHZ 15 
(Ger.). 
 131. See Wiebe, supra note 109, at 877, 880 (pointing out further problems in 
U.S. law). 
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services offered on basis of misused data excluded from commer-
cialization, and the right to claim compensation for damages for un-
authorized use of data.132 
At this juncture, we already need to point out the potential for 
conflict regarding personal data, as the protection of personal data 
is secured by article 8 of the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and, therefore, subject to legislative and judicial control. 
Additionally, data protection law foresees claims for damages 
itself if data is misused.133 Yet, these can only be asserted as far as 
personal data is concerned. The distinction between personal and 
non-personal data is unclear though, since in the era of big data, 
anonymous data can often be de-anonymized easily. Admittedly, 
potential economic risks arise in terms of a data ownership concept 
regarding claims for damages of the data subject that may hinder the 
usability and marketability of the respective data. 
However, it is very unclear how the amount of damage should 
be calculated. A reference point can be derived from the GDPR that 
contains rules on sanctions and damages. While the latter does not 
give any hint on the actual amount of damages, the first foresees up 
to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover or 20 million Euros. 
One has to keep in mind though that these numbers serve as a refer-
ence point in case privacy is violated, but cannot be used as far as 
industrial data is concerned—since data protection law protects 
other legal assets than mere economic interests. In this respect, one 
might refer to the calculation of damages in copyright law, where 
the amount of damage can be calculated on the basis of what should 
have been paid if the permission would have been lawfully re-
quested.134  
                                                                                                             
 132. For further information, see Commission Staff Working Document on the 
Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra 
note 68, at 33. 
 133. E.g., GDPR Art. 82. 
 134. See Act on Copyright and Related Rights, supra note 127, at § 97 sec. 2; 
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In contrast to a data ownership consisting of positive and nega-
tive competences, another approach proposes that the data originator 
could be given purely defensive rights,135 therefore promoting a 
“data possession” instead of a “data ownership.”136 Nonetheless, 
granting the data originator defensive rights in terms of property law 
should be limited to a certain extent, in order to prevent data mo-
nopolies. 
It can be summarized, that defensive rights are an indispensable 
part of a data ownership. This argument is supported by legal con-
siderations derived from moral rights within copyright law, which 
give the author inter alia the right to prohibit the distortion or any 
other derogatory treatment of his work, which is capable of preju-
dicing his legitimate intellectual or personal interest in the work. In 
this context, the work is already seen as being distorted when its 
independent character changes negatively.137 This is due to the au-
thor’s special relation to his work. Transferring this legal provision 
to the question at hand, one could argue that the data owner should 
be able to prohibit any distortion of the integrity of his data by third 
parties—since this data might hold information about him that he 
does not want to be distorted. Taking into account that our data own-
ership approach is based upon assumptions drawn from property 
law, issues regarding the scope of application of moral rights within 
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 135. Kerber, supra note 3, at 989, 991. 
 136. Herbert Zech, Information as a Tradable Commodity, in EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE, supra note 106, at 51, 63; for more 
details, see Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and 
Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, supra note 68, at 33 et seq. 
 137. Emphasised for several national European copyright laws by GOLDSTEIN 
& HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 134, at 19 et seq.; for further German commentary, 
see GERNOT SCHULZE, URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ: URHG § 14 no. 5 et seq. (5th ed., 
Thomas Dreier & Gernot Schulze eds. 2015); ANDREAS WIEBE, RECHT DER 
ELEKTRONISCHEN MEDIEN § 14 no. 4 et seq. (3d ed., Gerald Spindler & Fabian 
Schuster eds., Beck 2015); WINFRIED BULINGER, PRAXISKOMMENTAR ZUM 
URHEBERRECHT: URHR § 14 no. 4 et seq. (4th ed., Artur-Axel Wandtke & Win-
fried Bullinger eds., Beck 2014); see for a conceptual expansion of property re-
garding intellectual property law, Wielsch, supra note 117, at 77, 87 et seq. 
 137. GDPR Art. 2 § 1, Art. 6 § 1. 
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European copyright law are not addressed at this point, but may raise 
further questions in the future. As can be seen, the specific embed-
ment of defensive rights regarding data ownership as a legal concept 
within civil law is still a work in progress. 
D. Conflicting Rights 
The acceptance of exclusive rights regarding data potentially 
conflicts with rights of third parties or the law system itself. Personal 
data, which is information about an individual, is deeply knotted to 
the data subject. In Europe, the accessibility to and use of these data 
assets is tied to the explicit consent or an exceptional authorization 
by law, if they are generated automatically or either-way intended 
to form part of a filing system.138 Therefore, an ownership of per-
sonal data is usually determined by the data protection frame-
work.139 Data processing has to be compatible with a legitimate pur-
pose of the controller, for instance the performance of a contract.140 
The processing of special categories of personal data—e.g., racial or 
ethnic origin—is moreover generally prohibited, until particular in-
terests of third parties come up.141 In addition, the individual has 
extensive rights, which limit the processing of the collected infor-
mation, such as the possibility to withdraw the recent consent, right 
to access, rectification, erasure, and restriction.142 In this regard, 
data ownership can certainly be allocated to the data subject.143 On 
the contrary, the controller has only limited exclusive rights in terms 
of the collection, use and transmission of personal data. In order to 
                                                                                                             
 138. Id. 
 139. However, the GDPR does not apply to the processing of personal data by 
a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity, see 
GDPR Art. 2 § 2. 
 140. GDPR Art. 5 § 1(b), Art. 6 § 1(a). 
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ensure legal certainty, the controller should obtain the clear and ex-
tensive consent of the subject for data processing. To avoid these 
strict provisions of the European GDPR, one can introduce proce-
dures to anonymize data assets; for example by removing personal 
identifiers.144  
Another question that arises concerning property rights on data 
is the potential conflict with the ownership of the data carrier. Since 
data can easily be copied, modified, and transferred to other stor-
ages, the entitlement to use and access the storage and data may di-
verge. A contractual agreement with a cloud operator usually does 
not mean that the operator receives legal ownership on the stored 
data assets. Instead, the user merely intends temporary retention and 
requests for exclusive access to the information. In this context, the 
agreement of the parties has to be cultivated. 
Furthermore, confidentiality interests limit the use and disclo-
sure of data. If third parties have overriding socio-economic motives 
regarding the secrecy of data, the exploitation and transmission of 
these assets can be characterized as lacking good faith and are pos-
sibly punishable.145 
Beyond that, competition and antitrust law provide boundaries 
for the compilation of big data and data itself. Dominant positions 
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it is prohibited 
according to article 102 TFEU. It is reasonable to question whether 
or not companies like Facebook, which massively collect personal 
data, exploit their dominant positions and, therefore, should be re-
stricted.146 
                                                                                                             
 144. GDPR Art. 2 § 1. For further information on the GDPR and the former 
European Data Protecion Directive, see Arlette Noujaim, The Stimulus for Data 
Protection Law Around the World: The Development and Anticipated Effect of 
the European Union’s New Data Rules, 20 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 99, 102–113 
(2015–2016). 
 145. See Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [UWG] [Act against Unfair 
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Finally, European databases are protected “by reason of the selec-
tion or arrangement of their contents . . . [if] they constitute the au-
thor’s own intellectual creation.”147 Furthermore, a sui generis right 
determines the protection “for the maker of a database, which shows 
that there has been qualitatively, and/or quantitatively a substantial 
investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the 
contents.”148 These matters have to be respected in regard to the ac-
ceptance and limit of data ownership.149 
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VI. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis shows that the European framework of suprana-
tional and national laws provides a sufficient basis for a property 
law approach to data ownership. By taking the variety of European 
legal systems and their different models for acquiring and transfer-
ring ownership rights into account, our course of action proposes an 
argumentum a fortiori and follows a three-step approach. In the first 
place, it is crucial to specify how data as an asset can be allocated to 
a legal subject. We argue that potential criteria must consider infor-
mational, technological, and economical means. Secondly, we need 
to outline the contours of an exclusive data ownership right. From a 
property law angle, it grants both positive competences (rights of 
access, use, and licensing) and negative rights of defense (claims for 
damages and restitution). However, it is essential to stress that a data 
ownership cannot exist without limitations—despite its absolute na-
ture. Hence, and thirdly, those restrictions necessitate balancing data 
ownership with conflicting rights and interests such as intellectual 
property, confidentiality, or personal freedoms. These limitations fa-
cilitate an adequate level of protection for specific categories of data 
requiring protection from unlimited exploitation: privacy and data 
protection in particular. 
Our property law approach attempts to contribute to the debate 
on data ownership by pointing out that the economic reality—i.e., 
data being traded as an asset—can hardly be denied. However, this 
approach poses more of basic considerations than an actual concept 
since property laws are subject to national legislation. Still, in the 
light of national fragmentation, it became obvious that European ju-
risdictions need a strong commitment to seek common ground in 
order to ensure legal certainty and economic prosperity. 
 
